The Role of Politeness in Conversation
To understand the function of spoken language is to first understand the context in which that language is situated. Indeed, any pragmatist will tell you that the meaning of conversation is established only in relation to the social and interpersonal environment in which the conversation takes place. Thus, “concern with representational functions of language should be supplemented with attention to the social functions of language” (Brown & Levinson, 1987, p. 2). To study communication in the absence of social function is to divorce it, almost completely, from the meaning of the communication itself.
One social function of language thought to exist beyond the literal act of communication is the strengthening of interpersonal bonds between members of a group. In this way, language serves as a social tool used to maintain relationships between those who share a similar set of goals. In addition, language is thought to be involved with the regulation of aggression between members of a group and between members of different groups (Maynard-Smith, 1988). Due to the potential for threatening acts to occur between members of a group, the need to mitigate the impact of those acts verbally would be necessary for promoting the success and survival of the group. It is for this reason that the need for politeness in language likely developed with the need for language itself and concurrently shaped how language is used as a tradition among modern humans (Goody, 1978).
Brown and Levinson (1987) suggest that politeness serves a particular function when paired with a communicative act. In essence, its purpose is to acknowledge and respect an interlocutor’s ‘face’. Originally developed by Goffman (1967), the concept of ‘face’ is the idea that each individual maintains a public image of the self in the company of others. It can be interpreted as a kind of persona that individuals adopt while engaging in conversation. This persona is thought to have a specific set of wants and needs and will work toward satisfying those wants and needs in communication with others. Thus, agreeing to engage in conversation with another is also agreeing to recognize the other’s ‘face’ and the wants and needs of that face. Interestingly, this mutual understanding is thought to occur unconsciously, or at least below the awareness that is generally adopted by those engaged in conversation.
From this perspective, an obvious consequence of engaging in conversation is that one has the potential to either gain support or lose support for one’s face. Brown and Levinson (1987) refer to a gain in support of one’s face as ‘positive face’ and a loss in support of one’s face as ‘negative face’. Positive face is the perception that one’s face is admired or desired by others. Examples of speech acts that communicate positive face include approval, agreement, appreciation, cooperation, and compliments. Negative face is the perception that one’s face is being taken advantage of by others or imposed upon by others. Examples of speech acts that communicate negative face include orders, requests, threats, suggestions, and warnings. Any speech act that threatens positive or negative face is considered a ‘face-threatening act’ (FTA).
According to Brown and Levinson, FTA’s can be presented by either the speaker or the addressee at any point during conversation. Therefore, the use of politeness during conversation serves the purpose of either maintaining one’s face or minimizing the impact of an FTA upon another’s face. A lack of politeness during conversation is an obvious FTA and will lead to interpersonal conflict if not quickly redressed. Interestingly, when an FTA must be presented for one reason or another, the one who presents the FTA will prepare a strategy for how to present the FTA so as to not offend their interlocutor. Brown and Levinson organize these strategies into four distinct categories: on-record, off-record, bald with redress, and bald without redress.
On-record is when the FTA is presented directly and publicly, as in, “Can you pass the salt?” (a request from the speaker that threatens the negative face of the addressee). Off-record is when the FTA is presented indirectly as implicature, as in, “Darn, I’m out of cash” (a request for cash from the speaker that threatens the negative face of the addressee). Bald with redress is when an FTA must be presented directly but is softened, as in, “I’m sorry, but you need to leave” (a hedged warning from the speaker that threatens the negative face of the addressee). Lastly, bald without redress is when an FTA must be presented directly and is not softened, as in, “You need to leave” (a non-hedged warning from the speaker that threatens the negative face of the addressee). Whether the strategy used to present the FTA is direct or indirect, public or private, or redressed or not redressed, one aspect of the strategy seems clear: Its preparation is done in careful consideration to the social and interpersonal nature of the interaction. The complexity of these speech acts, and the frequency with which they occur, suggest that such acts are inherent to the use of language and may have even contributed to the development of the sociality and intelligence of our species (Goody, 1978).
In consideration of the importance of politeness in communication, Brown and Levinson (1987) suggest that politeness satisfies a much deeper need in conversation than can be met by the literal representation of speech. In this sense, politeness fulfills a much more fundamental role in communication than the communicative act itself. Rather than serving some secondary function of making speech appear friendly or nonconfrontational, politeness serves the primary function of establishing the social and emotional foundation upon which language is used to communicate. After all, if one did not first attend to politeness in conversation, one would not be able to communicate at all—let alone successfully. So just as Grice (1975) suggests that the meaning of communication is derived from that which is implied rather from that which is stated, the inherent meaning of politeness in conversation may be derived similarly. That is, it may be that the implied meaning of conversation in regard to politeness is more important than the literal meaning of conversation in regard to speech itself. If politeness is indeed the most important aspect of communication, will people prioritize the meaning of communication in relation to politeness over the meaning of communication in relation other aspects such as the literal representation of speech or the need to ground that speech with another?
Rightfully so, Clark (1996) suggests that like any meaningful aspect of communication, politeness must be grounded in conversation. He explains that politeness (or a lack of politeness) offers interlocutors a means by which to negotiate common ground. For example, Person A may be upset with Person B for having asked the same question twice. In response to this question, Person A may react politely without an FTA or impolitely with an FTA. The purpose of using an FTA in this case would be to strategically draw attention to a greater function of the speech act, or rather, to the implied meaning of the speech act (i.e., “You should not have asked me this question a second time”). Upon interpretation, Person B is expected to recognize the meaning of the implied speech act and then offer an apology so as to appropriately ground with Person A.
Much like Clark (1996), Grice (1975) discusses the idea that implicature is essential for creating shared understanding. Flouting in conversation, for example, forces an interlocutor to look beyond the surface meaning of a speech act to gain a better understanding of the intentions of another. From this perspective, the act of communication is wholly cooperative: It is a goal shared by those involved in conversation to reach a sense of mutual understanding of that which is being communicated. In addition, communication is thought to be a rational pursuit in which those involved in communication strive to make rational contributions toward the shared goal of grounding. If one appears to breach this pursuit, the belief is that the person is merely flouting the pursuit for some rational purpose. That is, if one appears to be irrational in their contribution to a conversation (e.g., by saying more than is relevant) the actual reason for this irrationality will be—assuming able and honest cooperation—wholly rational (i.e., to draw attention to the reason for flouting, and thus, to the implied meaning of the speech act). In light of politeness, however, I argue that conversation is not as rational as it is supposed to be by Clark and Grice. Rather, conversation is merely made to appear rational by those who are involved in the conversation for the purpose of negotiating support for the ‘faces’ of those involved in the conversation. It is my belief that, given the opportunity to become rational and cooperative agents in conversation, people will ultimately choose to become uncooperative and irrational agents if that uncooperative and irrational behavior provides them with the opportunity to garner support for their respective ‘faces’. The act of communication, in this regard, provides an entirely different social function than that which was previously supposed—a function not in support of a rational and cooperative grounding criterion, but rather, a function in support of an irrational and emotional face-satisfying criterion. As suggested above, the motivation to achieve such a criterion is for the purpose of procuring social and emotional satisfaction for the ‘face’. Thus, it is this inherent need to gain socio-emotional support for the ‘face’ that will lead people to prioritize behavior that protects and promotes the face over behavior that protects and promotes rational grounding. For this reason, I suggest that the true goal of those involved in conversation is not to fulfill an inherent need to achieve rational and mutual understanding of that which has been said in conversation, but rather, to fulfill the inherent need to achieve an irrational and emotional positive conception of ‘face’ at the expense of any and all cooperative activity.
References
Brown, P., & Levinson, S. C. (1987). Politeness: Some universals in language usage (Vol. 4). Cambridge university press.
Clark, H. H. (1996). Using language. Cambridge university press.
Goffman, E. 1967. Interaction ritual: essays on face to face behavior. Garden City, New York.
Goody, E. N. (Ed.). (1978). Questions and politeness: Strategies in social interaction (Vol. 8). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Grice, H. P., Cole, P., & Morgan, J. L. (1975). Logic and conversation. 1975, 41-58.
Maynard-Smith, J. (1988). Origins of social behavior. Origins: The Darwin College Lectures (Vol. 1). Cambridge University Press.